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ABSTRACT
We draw innovatively on new and existing public opinion survey data carried
out across North African countries since 2011 to provide a ‘view from below’
of the type of democracy that citizens of North African countries want and
compare this conception with the type of democracy the European Union
(EU) ‘offers’ its counterparts in the ‘Southern Neighbourhood’. This
comparison shows there is a mismatch between what citizens want and what
the EU is offering. While citizens want a ‘thicker’, socially just democracy, the
EU ‘offers’ a market democracy that prioritises a limited number of civil and
political rights. Social and economic rights are discursively constructed as
macroeconomic issues relevant to the stability and consolidation of
democracy rather than human rights as integral to democracy as their civil–
political counterparts.
KEYWORDS European Union; Arab Spring; European Neighbourhood Policy; democracy; neoliberalism;
social and economic rights
Introduction
This article examines the type of democracy that citizens of North African
countries want in order to compare it with the type of democracy the Euro-
pean Union (EU) Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) ‘supplies’. Much of the litera-
ture on the EU and its foreign policy towards the region – especially its
‘democracy assistance’ – focuses on analysing the limits of EU democracy pro-
motion or its foreign policy generally, or on regional governments. When the
views of people – rather than governments – are considered, this has usually
drawn on qualitative interviews with Civil Society (CS) activists or leaders
rather than the views of public opinion. This paper provides an additional
‘view from below’ by using findings from public opinion surveys carried
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out across North African countries since 2011, which collect data on citizens’
political, economic, and social attitudes.
We build on recent but geographically limited studies (Teti, Abbott, and
Cavatorta 2019) to argue there is indeed a ‘demand for democracy’ across
the region. However, it is not the type of democracy on offer from the Euro-
pean Union: while discourse analyses of EU policy and implementation docu-
ments shows that it focuses on the formal, procedural aspects of liberal
democracy – e.g. regular ‘free and fair’ elections and related civil–political
rights –, survey data suggests citizens also think of democracy as ‘thicker’,
more substantive, and delivering social and economic human rights and
‘social justice’ (Teti et al. 2020).
The mismatch between populations’ ‘demand for democracy’ and the EU’s
‘supply’ is vital in explaining the Union’s lack of ‘normative power’ in its
‘Southern Neighbourhood’, and helps understand its failure to build a ‘ring
of friends’ there. It also illustrates some root causes of instability in the
region: even where countries are apparently stable, they are, in fact, brittle,
unstable ‘sinkholes of insecurity’ (Teti, Abbott, and Cavatorta 2018).
Methods
The EU ‘supply’ of democracy has been analysed extensively elsewhere, with
discourse analytic approaches showing that despite an ecumenical emphasis
on the multiple possible forms of democracy and the ‘indivisibility’ of human
rights, throughout ENP documents, the EU adopts a minimalist, procedural
conception of democracy focusing on civil–political rights and on ‘free and
fair’ elections. In contrast, social and economic human rights, in particular,
are redefined as matters of (macro) economic policy, not of rights (For a
detailed examination of these issues and EU policy towards the region, see
Teti et al. 2020).
To examine whether there is a ‘demand for democracy’ in North African
countries and whether populations’ conceptions of democracy match the
EU’s or not, we draw on questions available in public opinion surveys
carried out in North Africa since 2010 about what sort of government citizens
want. We mainly use the Arab Barometer (AB) carried out in 2010–11 (ABII),
2013 (ABIII), and 2018 (ABV) supplemented by the Arab Transformations
survey of 2014 (AT), 2016s ABIV, and the World Values Survey Wave 6
(WVS6) carried out between 2011 and 2014. All are stratified probability
surveys allowing generalisations at the national level as they are representa-
tive of the adult population 18 years and over.
There is a core set of questions on democracy and human rights in these
surveys, though not all surveys include all such questions. Nor were all
countries included in all rounds of these surveys: ABII only included Egypt
and Tunisia, ABVI excluded Libya, while AT excluded Algeria. Unless otherwise
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indicated, data in the Results section is from ABV, the most recent survey in
the region, dating to late 2018.
Surveys were carried out in local languages by experienced local teams
using the same questionnaire (for each survey). All participants were asked
to give informed consent, and data handling and management procedures
were in place to ensure the security of data and safety of both participants
and interviewers.
It was impossible to weigh the data to correct for accidental over-or under-
sampling because of the lack of recent and accurate population data/esti-
mates for all countries. We, therefore, used unweighted data, relying on
the design of survey samples to ensure samples represented the populations
they were drawn from.
The usefulness of surveys and questions of data quality
In middle- and low-income countries, survey quality is generally considered
good enough to measure national-level subjective orientations (Inglehart
and Welzel 2010). This is not to say surveys do not have limitations or pose
particular challenges. Nor should they be used in place of other methods.
That said, within those limitations, surveys do provide a broad picture of
public opinion in each country, generalisable at the national level, in a way
difficult to replicate. They furnish important insights into citizens’ attitudes to
democracy and human rights in the five countries in the aftermath of the Arab
Uprisings and enable us to compare citizens’ understanding of what democracy
is with what is being offered by the EU in its foreign policy to the region.
We also accounted for two common data-quality issues. One involves
identifying cases where there was a possibility of fraud by either dupli-
cation/near-duplication (excessive similarity in questionnaires) or by
random completion (excessive variance). We used PercentMatch to identify
and excluded the former and developed a new application of PercentMatch
to detect the latter (Kuriakose and Robbins 2016; Abbott et al. 2017). The
second issue regards the treatment of ‘do not know’ and ‘refused’ answers.
Usually, these answers are excluded on the basis that only data providing a
‘substantive’ response should be used. However, we include these responses
– when these could be considered valid responses – for several reasons. First,
data collectors are trained to encourage respondents to give a substantive
response and instructed not to read out ‘do not know’ and ‘refused’ as
options; thus, respondents must be genuinely determined not to select
from the options offered, suggesting none of those options approximates
their preferences. Second, these responses are noticeable on some questions
about democracy and preferences of political system across the surveys, and
also vary significantly by country and question. Whatever the reason for the
‘do not know’ responses, if they are discounted, then the proportions of
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respondents who support democracy – or another regime type – will almost
certainly be overestimated. Finally, excluding such responses assumes that
they are distributed randomly across the population, which is unlikely (Ber-
insky and Tucker 2006). Thus, such exclusion would likely skew results.
We have followed the usual convention of combining ‘agree’ and ‘strongly
agree’ responses as indicating support, although this may not adequately
measure the degree of commitment.
Finally, we use mainly descriptive statistics because we are interested in
national-level ‘sentiment’ and not differences between groups or the
drivers of differences between groups. While there are differences between
countries on some variables that are unlikely to be due to chance, in this
article, we are concerned with the mismatch between public sentiment
and EU policy towards the region. This does not mean that notable differ-
ences in attitudes between countries are unimportant – indeed, these differ-
ences question the practice by some scholarship of pooling data and
presenting findings suggesting that there are common ‘Arab’ attitudes. For
example, with respect to gender equality, although compared to other
countries worldwide, Arab states tend to cluster, when compared within
the region, Morocco and Tunisia have significantly more liberal attitudes
than other surveyed countries, despite these being more conservative than
in European countries (Abbott 2016; Teti et al. 2020).
Results and analysis: what ‘The people’ want
In this section, we examine citizens’ understanding of and attitudes towards
democracy across North Africa. To do this, in addition to questions directly
related to democracy, we draw on both direct and indirect questions on
the type(s) of regime respondents support for their country. (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Two main causes of the uprisings, %. Source: ABIII.
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People’s priorities, challenges, and causes of the uprisings
The EU’s assumption was – and remains – that what MENA citizens want is
democracy understood as liberal democracy and human rights understood
as a specific subset of civil and political rights. However, survey data consist-
ently challenges this interpretation since at least 2011, when the Arab Barom-
eter collected data shortly after the Uprisings, which showed a mismatch
between what people want and what the EU offers (Teti, Abbott, and Cava-
torta 2018; Teti et al. 2020). Asked in 2013 what they thought the two
main causes of the Uprisings were, the three possible causes most frequently
nominated were: their country’s economic situation, corruption, and civil and
political rights (Figure 2). In Algeria, the proportion nominating the economic
situation and corruption were the same, with democracy mentioned less fre-
quently. In Egypt, Libya, and Morocco, the most frequently mentioned chal-
lenge was the economic situation, followed by corruption. In Tunisia, the
most frequently mentioned was the economic situation followed by political
and civil rights. In Algeria and Egypt, 15% nonmined social and economic
justice, while proportions were much smaller in the other three countries.
The Uprisings were partly motivated by a demand for democracy.
However, the economic situation and government corruption were con-
sidered equally, if not more important. This suggests that the Uprisings
were more than a call for liberal democracy: they were a call to end a
system based on (government) corruption, and for social justice, for econ-
omic growth benefiting the middle and working classes, not just elites. This
is compatible with social democracy, albeit not identical – but it cannot be
reduced to liberal democracy alone.
Figure 2. Two most important challenges facing country in 2018, %. Source: ABV.
Note: Other: 0.8% Algeria, 3.2% Egypt, 1.5% Libya, 26.8% Morocco, 3.9% Tunisia (no information
recorded for ‘other’). Missing values: 1.4% Algeria, 5.2% Egypt, 2.3% Libya, 5.6%. Morocco 1.0% Tunisia.
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Citizens’ priorities become even clearer when asked to indicate the two
most pressing challenges facing their country: here, since 2011, with the
notable exception of Libya, citizens identified the economic situation
(poverty, unemployment and price increases) as the main challenge, followed
by corruption and then security. In 2013 Libyans most frequently nominated
foreign interference (47%) but with corruption (29%) and the economic situ-
ation (19%) nominated far more frequently than democracy (4%). In 2018,
respondents had more options to select two from, but again except for
Libya, the same pattern holds: the economic situation is most frequently
nominated, with only a tiny minority nominating ‘democracy and representa-
tive government’ (Figure 3). In Libya, perhaps unsurprisingly, the most fre-
quently mention was security followed by foreign interference and
corruption. Only one per cent mentioned democracy.
The main conclusion from an analysis of the responses to the questions on
the drivers of the Uprisings and the most serious challenges facing respon-
dents’ countries is that while there may be a demand for liberal democracy
across North Africa, citizens have more pressing priorities than democracy
as a mere institutional design.
Democracy in principle
This conclusion is confirmed by answers to direct questions about the type of
political system respondents think is best and what type(s) of political
systems are suitable for their respective countries. Survey data since the
2000s consistently shows three things: first, that citizens do not think they
live in a democracy; second, that democracy despite its faults is preferred
Figure 3. Two most important features of democracy, % Nominated as one of two.
Source: ABIII.
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to other systems; and third, that support for democracy is not unconditional
(Teti, Abbott, and Cavatorta 2018; Teti, Abbott, and Cavatorta 2019).
In 2011, 2013, and 2018 citizens rated their governments as hybrid, clearly
indicating they do not believe they live in democracies, whatever the official
rhetoric about elections or popular representation might be. In 2013, means
on an 11-point scale going from 0 (not a democracy) to 10 (full democracy)
ranged from a high of 6.7 in Algeria to a low of 4.5 in Egypt (6.2 in Libya,
5.3 in Tunisia, 5.2 in Morocco).1 By 2018, the means had dropped, ranging
from a high of 5.2 in Egypt to a low of 2.4 in Libya (3.9 in Algeria, 4.1 in
Morocco, 4.6 in Tunisia).2 Especially noteworthy is that citizens in Tunisia –
the one country recognised by Western Governments as transitioning to
democracy – did not think that their country was a democracy either in
2013 or by 2018.
By contrast, most citizens agree democracy is a better system of govern-
ment than any alternatives. In 2011, shortly after the Uprisings, 70% of
both Egyptians and Tunisians agreed democracy was better than other
systems (AB II); in 2013, around 70% of citizens in each country surveyed
agreed (AB III); and in 2018, a majority continued to agree democracy was
preferable to other systems, ranging from a high of 79% in Tunisia to a low
of 62% in Morocco (Table 1).
However, when asked if democracy is always preferable to other systems
of government, the proportion agreeing fell in all countries, with less than
half of citizens in Algeria and Egypt agreeing it was always preferable. This
suggests that commitment to democracy is, in some ways, conditional and
not absolute.
Characteristics of democracy: form vs substance
Given that popular support for democracy is likely not unconditional, it is
crucial to understand what type of political system citizens want. It is
evident from answers to a question asking respondents to nominate the
two most important characteristics of democracy North African citizens do
not have the same understanding of democracy as the EU’s minimalist, ‘pro-
cedural’ conception. Firstly, only a relatively small proportion in each country
nominate free and fair elections as an essential characteristic of democracy,
varying from a high of 19% in Tunisia to a low of 8% in Morocco in 2013
Table 1. Demand for democracy in 2018.
Algeria Egypt Libya Morocco Tunisia
% Agree Democracy Better than Other Systems 67.6 73.3 74.1 62.0 79.3
% Agree that Democracy is Always Preferable to Other
Systems of Government
40.4 41.9 57.2 53.1 64.4
Source: ABV.
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despite a substantial element of EU democracy assistance having been spent
on election monitoring, not least in Tunisia and Morocco themselves (Figure
4). Secondly, in every country, eliminating corruption is nominated as an
essential characteristic of democracy more frequently than free and fair elec-
tions, ranging from 13% in Egypt to 32% in Libya. Thirdly, citizens see econ-
omic justice as an essential element of democracy. Comparing the proportion
nominating at least one of the three civil and political rights (Algeria 42%,
Egypt 37%, Libya 44%, Morocco 29%, Tunisia 45%) and those nominating
at least one of the two economic rights (Algeria 37%, Egypt 49%, Libya
19%, Morocco 51%, Tunisia 22%) it is clear that North Africans want social
democracy rather than the liberal democracy prompted by the EU in their
countries. Indeed, citizens want the decent society the EU claims its policies
will bring about, but which the Union has increasingly been failing to provide
both internally and in its support for democracy and development – except in
those forms supplied through marketised, neoliberal processes which have
thoroughly failed over the past several decades, resulting in greater social
vulnerability and lower social mobility.
In 2018, the Arab Barometer gave survey participants a different set of
options to select one from as the most important characteristic of democracy
(Figure 5). Again, respondents do not prioritise free and fair elections or fun-
damental civil–political rights as the main characteristic of democracy. In all
five countries, the government ensuring law and order and ensuring job
opportunities for all are equally or more important than free and fair elections
or the media being free to criticise the government. Especially notable is that
more than half of Tunisians think that the main characteristic of a democracy
is to ensure job opportunities for all. This goes some way to explaining why so
few Tunisians see their country as a democracy, given that post-2011 unem-
ployment – especially youth unemployment – has remained high, and many
of those in employment are in precarious and/or poorly paid jobs.
The answers to the questions on the definition of democracy should not
be taken to mean that North African populations do not want free and fair
elections or civil and political rights. Rather, taken in the context of other
findings, it suggests that respondents want more than just the formal
Figure 4. Main characteristic of democracy. Source: ABV.
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guarantee of civil–political rights, they also want conditions that enable
democracy to function and deliver substantively, including socio-economic
rights. A majority of citizens across each country agree a parliamentary
system of government where secular and religious political parties can
compete is appropriate for their country (Egypt 89%; 88% Morocco; 83%
Tunisia; Algeria 81%; Libya 53%) (ABIII). There is also a strong demand for
civil and political rights, even though they are not prioritised as highly as
socio-economic rights. In 2013, over 80% of citizens across the five countries
agreed that political freedoms such as freedom of the press, freedom of
expression and freedom to establish associations were important (Algeria
95.4%; Egypt 88.5%; Libya 83.9%; Morocco 86.7%; Tunisia 85.2%) (ABIII).
However, there was even stronger support for the constitutions of their
countries guaranteeing workers’ rights (Algeria 90%, Egypt 93%, Libya 93%,
Morocco 77%, Tunisia 93%) and for guaranteeing social protection and
health insurance for the poor (Algeria 89%; Egypt 94%; Libya 94%; Morocco
94%; Tunisia 93%).
Religion, human rights, and democracy
The democracy the EU champions involves secularism, human rights as set
out in UN conventions and the ‘European Social Model’ eclectically woven
into a particular self-narrative of emancipation, namely that through a com-
bination of free markets and liberal democracy (Western), European states
reforged the post-war Old Continent into a land of peace and prosperity –
where these were the result of a combination of social democratic ‘Keynesian’
protectionism, social democracy (welfare states) and the Cold War.
Under the banner of this neoliberalised ‘European Social Model’, however,
one also finds ideas and themes related to the role of ‘culture’ in producing
this ever closer and more prosperous union – specifically ideas about ‘funda-
mental values’, the civic-cultural requirements of ‘good governance’ (e.g. the
Figure 5. Agree/disagree with the proposition that democracy is incompatible with
Islam, %. Source: ABIII.
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rule of law, anti-corruption), and secularism. The clearest statement of this
construct appears in the first definition of ‘deep democracy’ given by the
Union in 2013, a definition at the heart of the discursive framework
through which the EU formulated its response to the Uprisings. In its New
Response to a Changing Neighbourhood, the Union defines ‘deep democracy’
as
the kind [of democracy] that lasts because the right to vote is accompanied by
rights to exercise free speech, form competing political parties, receive impartial
justice from independent judges, security from accountable police and army
forces, access to a competent and non-corrupt civil service – and other civil
and human rights that many Europeans take for granted, such as the freedom
of thought, conscience and religion. (European Commission 2011b, 2 emphasis
added)
If the centrality of culture/religion were not clear enough, NRCN specifies that
in order to consolidate – i.e. to transform revolt into democratic transition –
such deep democracy must be accompanied by a ‘commitment to the univer-
sal values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law’ (European Com-
mission 2011b, 2).
This conception of democracy – found more or less explicitly in sub-
sequent documentation, bilateral Association Agreements as much as strat-
egy documents – is crucial also in reaffirming/reconstructing the Union as
a bearer of these values and a ‘normative power’ willing and able to
promote them. However, insofar as the Southern Neighbourhood is expected
to accept, adopt and internalise the ‘fundamental values’ supposedly crucial
to democracy, ‘inclusive growth’ and stability, the ENP’s discursive framework
effectively constructs the ‘Neighbourhood’ as the EU’s ‘culturally’
defective/lacking ‘Other’ in need of being ‘normalised’, made more like the
EU’s particular view of (neo)liberal democratic governance (Bicchi 2006; Del
Sarto 2016).
Neighbourhood governments adopted and adapted this narrative –
including aspects of its culturalised, essentialised alterity –, using it to
deflect and diffract demands for democracy, particularly from their popu-
lations. Effectively, regimes engaged in a form of Foucaultian counter-
conduct designed to neutralise rather than advance democracy (Malmvig
2012, 2014). Malmvig highlights this dynamic in the context of democracy-
promotion – e.g. adopting the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam
(CDHRI) (Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers 1990) – while others point
to Turkey’s ‘de-Europeanisation’ (e.g. Cebeci 2016). Indeed, this mutually
adaptive dynamic can be discerned in a broad range of contexts, not least
opposition to authoritarian regimes themselves (Camau 2002), and can
perhaps help interpret apparently confusing survey responses on the
relationship between religion and democracy.
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The full implications of the centrality of ‘European values’ in the EU’s con-
struction of the Neighbourhood Policy becomes apparent when one con-
siders popular preferences around religion and politics, which emerge
through survey data.
For citizens, religion is undoubtedly important. For example, two-thirds
of respondents or more see themselves as religious (Algeria 82%, Egypt
89%, Libya 78%, Morocco 84%, Tunisia 68%) (ABV, 2018). In 2013, respon-
dents also said that their countries’ Constitutions should mandate ‘shari’a’
as the ‘main source of law’ (Algeria, 87%; Egypt, 87%; Libya, 89%;
Morocco, 84%; Tunisia, 71%) (ABIII), with only around 10% of citizens in
Algeria (5.6%) Egypt (7.1%) Libya (11.4%) and Morocco (14.3%) agreeing
law should be based ‘solely’ on the ‘will of the people’. Even in Tunisia,
where there has been civil law since the 1950s, this only rises to a
quarter. A simplistic analysis might lead to the conclusion that religion
has a strong influence on politics and, therefore, on the (possibility of)
democracy in the region.
However, probing both responses and their context more closely, the
relation between belief and politics appears far from clear, both in its syn-
chronic, contingent articulation and in its relations of causality over time.
First, survey designs make it difficult to clarify what precisely the ‘demand
for religion’ entails in the minds of respondents, specifically whether ‘Islam’
acts as a master signifier into which respondents invest all sorts of different
conceptions, grievances and priorities (rather than Islam per se being (in)com-
patible with democracy or not). For example, survey questions on ‘shari’a’ or
on ‘Islam’ treat these as though they were monolithic bodies of jurisprudence
or theology, even though minimal familiarity with Islamic theology and juris-
prudence in theory and practice should put to rest any illusions of homogen-
eity. Beyond representing a rejection of the secularism which post-colonial
populist-nationalist Arab republics rhetorically championed, it is difficult to
conclude what kind of ‘Islamic’ political project respondents favouring
‘shari’a’ would support. Not least because supposedly ‘secular’ Arab
regimes often deploy. Rather, these ambiguities appear compatible with a
‘re-traditionalisation’ dynamic: indeed, observers have long noted the
influence of the decline of secular Arab nationalism twinned with regional
regimes’ manipulation of religion to suit their conservative agendas (e.g.
Tibi 2008).
Conversely, there is well-accepted literature illustrating the compatibility
of ‘Political Islam’ and democracy – e.g. if religious, political parties agree
to compete with secular ones for power (Schwedler 2007, 2011). Moreover,
surveys suggest people display significant scepticism towards (current) reli-
gious elites, and respondents oppose a role for unelected religious leaders
in making or vetting political decisions (see data below). This suggests
popular preferences approximate the ‘twin tolerances’ orthodox scholarship
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holds necessary for democracy (Driessen 2018; Cesari 2013; Stepan 2012;
Stepan and Linz 2013).
Secondly, closer examinations of survey data on other issues pertaining to
the interface between religion and politics suggest citizens display a complex
conception of the relationship between religion and democracy. Respon-
dents’ support for ‘shari’a’, for example, maybe related to what they see as
the characteristics of a government driven by such ‘shari’a’. A majority of
respondents in each country agree such a government should: provides
essential services (varying from a low of 70% in Tunisia to a high of 89% in
Egypt) and not be corrupt (ranging from lows of 32% in Algeria and 54% in
Tunisia, to 91% in Egypt). It is important to note that these conceptions
echo respondents’ perceptions of the key challenges and priorities facing
their respective countries and were also among the main drivers of support
for the 2010–11 Uprisings (ABV). As ABII and AT data show, corruption is con-
sistently among the top issues that respondents perceive as the most critical
challenges facing their countries and is the single most important factor
driving support for the Uprisings (Teti, Abbott, and Cavatorta 2019).
Moreover, responses on the relationship between religion and politics on
other questions suggest it is impossible to infer from support for religious
principles an incompatibility between religion and democracy or even resist-
ance to the possibility of democratisation. For example, only a minority of citi-
zens in each country agree that democracy is incompatible with democracy,
but the proportion agreeing is still, at its lowest, nearly 1 in 10 citizens in
Egypt, rising to over 3 in 10 in Tunisia (Figure 6).
Also, while a noticeable proportion of citizens say they trust religious
leaders and prefer a religious party, a majority clearly state they do not
want religious leaders interfering in elections or government decisions. Nor
Figure 6. Religion and politics. Source: ABV.
12 P. ABBOTT AND A. TETI
do they believe their countries would be better off with religious leaders
(Figure 6). This data confirms it is too simplistic to infer from questions on
‘shari’a’ that people want ‘religious government’ in the sense of a conserva-
tive, antidemocratic brand of Islam which emerged as a combined conse-
quence of the failures of post-colonial nationalist governments, of
proselytism from private and state actors in the oil-rich Gulf, and of
Western governments’ dislike of Islamist parties. Indeed, in ABV, only a min-
ority trusted the main Islamist group in their country: 13.7% in Egypt, 8.5% in
Libya, 26.1% in Morocco and 17.1% in Tunisia.
An analogous contextualisation is necessary to interpret the levels of
societal rejection of equal rights for women, non-Muslims and non-hetero-
normative values and attitudes. Some studies argue consolidated democra-
cies score highly on adopting these rights and the values and attitudes
which go with them, but that North African respondents by and large do
not display these ‘secular-rational’ values or have ‘self-expression’ attitudes,
concluding that people’s values and attitudes remain a barrier to democracy
(Norris 2015; Inglehart 2010, 2017; Welzel and Inglehart 2008; Rowley and
Smith 2009). This approach also suggests that the strong support for at
least some law being based on shari’a rather than the will of the people is
both antithetical to democracy and discriminates against, for example, the
rights of women, non-Muslims and non-heterosexual citizens (An-Na’im
2010; Norris 2015; Rowley and Smith 2009).
What this approach risks obfuscating is that these values and attitudes are
often not ‘traditional’, but are relatively recent, invented traditions constructed
both by Islamist movements – which, in opposition, gained influence after the
decline of the Left in the Arab world – and, as noted above, by Arab regimes
themselves. These regimes have sought to shore up their legitimacy with ‘tra-
dition’ and to strike a new authoritarian bargain with Islamist groups in which
their social influence – earned partly by replacing increasingly kleptocratic
states in providing essential services like education or health – was allowed
in exchange for their political quietism. (Table 2).
Discussion: the roots of a ‘normatively powerless Europe’:
diverging conceptions of democracy
In this section, we consider the broader significance of the data outlined
above, both for the question of the popular demand for democracy in
North Africa and for the EU’s puzzling inability to act on that demand.
Popular demands and the ‘authoritarian impasse’ in North Africa
Before the ‘Arab Spring’, North African regimes were mostly considered resi-
lient, with little evidence of opposition groups being able to affect
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nationwide political change. This apparent stability had been explained by
factors such as economic or strategic rents enabling authoritarian regimes
to strike am ‘authoritarian bargain’ with (middle class) citizens (Ross 2011;
Schwarz 2008; cf. Oskarsson and Ottosen 2010); authoritarian rulers’ skill at
diffusing discontent (Brumberg 2002; Heydemann 2007; Hinnebusch 2006);
Western powers’ support to ensure their own security and supplies of
energy; and so-called ‘Islamic’, ‘Arab’, or ‘traditional’ values supposedly anti-
thetical to democracy (Fish 2011; Bishin and Cherif 2017; Inglehart and
Norris 2003; Norris and Inglehart 2002).
While to varying extents, these factors contributed to regimes’ apparent
stability, beneath the surface of an apparent calm rarely disturbed by overt
nationwide grievances –much less mass protest – the ‘authoritarian bargains’
which had contributed to that apparent stability throughout the postcolonial
period had been eroding. The promise of a decent standard of living and jobs
in return for political acquiescence had been gradually cut back since the
1970s by welfare cuts, privatisations and other ‘open door’ economic policies,
not least in response to demands from Western allies (Hanieh 2013; Achcar
2013). This erosion of rights and living standards required repression to
keep increasingly disgruntled populations politically passive. Populist author-
itarian regimes had historically used strategies of political ‘decompression’
(Hinnebusch 1998) – i.e. concessions and openings to absorb protest or co-
opt opponents. Such political openings became harder as ‘reforms’ pro-
gressed since they might allow opposition groups to gain traction. This
meant post-populist autocracies had to simultaneously impose both econ-
omic and political strictures on their populations (Teti, Abbott, and Cavatorta
2018) while slowly morphing political systems’ façades to mimic liberal
democracy (Collier and Levitsky 1997).
In short, North African regimes feigned the political reform they could no
longer afford. Consciously or not, under the banner of ‘stability’ and a
Table 2: Attitudes to equal rights.
Algeria Egypt Libya Morocco Tunisia
Homosexuality Never Justified, %1 93.3 99.9 80.2 93.8 87.2
Only Acceptable Religion My Religion, %1 83.0 na 94.8 91.1 87.2
Constitution Mandate Equal Rights for Men and
Women, %2
70.0 89.0 82.0 87.0 80.0
Family Law Should be Based on shari’a, %2 95.0 90.0 97.0 88.0 64.0
Family Law Should be Based on an Accurate
Interpretation of shari’a as opposed to an
interpretation based on current debates or civil Law,
%2
77.7 80.7 75.7 69.6 47.9
Husband Should Always Have the Final Say in Family
Matters, %3
70.0 67.0 63.7 47.0 54.0
Disagree that Men Make Better Politicians than Women,
%3
26.4 26.3 28.3 51.1 41.6
Sources: 1: WVS6, 2: ABIII, 3: ABV.
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‘pragmatic’ gradualist approach to democratisation, the EU supported these
strategies. The impasse which North African regimes and their EU counter-
parts had gotten themselves into effectively ‘blinded’ them to mass discon-
tent, to its roots and consequences.
Spontaneous demonstrations, which began in Tunisia in December 2010,
rapidly spread across North Africa and beyond once the country’s autocratic
president and his notoriously kleptocratic family clan were removed from
office in January 2011. Protests were driven primarily by opposition to corrup-
tion, growing social injustice, and political oppression (Teti, Abbott, and Cava-
torta 2018). Furthermore, while there was strong support for democracy
generally among citizens (Abdelrahman 2015; Tessler, Jamal, and Robbins
2012; Tessler and Robbins 2014; Robbins 2015), protesters’ conceptions of
democracy reflected this concern with corruption and with socio-economic
rights and outcomes – alongside civil–political rights including the rights of
assembly and protest (Teti, Abbott, and Cavatorta 2019).
Blinded by neoliberalism
The EU’s ‘policy blindness’ to the roots of these revolts quickly became
evident in its strategic reaction to the Uprisings. On the one hand, it
responded positively to the ‘Arab Spring’, acknowledging it had not pre-
viously prioritised people’s aspirations, admitting that it had supported
authoritarian regimes, and committing to ‘bringing its interests in line with
its values’ and to revising policy to reflect protesters’ demands (Füle 2011;
Teti et al. 2020). On the other hand, it soon became apparent that the EU
failed to do so (Teti, Thompson, and Noble 2013).
The reason for this ‘blindness’ has at least partly to do with the Union’s
vision of itself and how it translates that vision into policy. The EU’s pre-Upris-
ings policy framework was built on the notion that inclusive democracy and
development would be achieved through ‘market liberalisation’, and in par-
ticular through the attraction of regulatory convergence with the EU itself,
whereby through a process of supplying ‘everything but membership’
(Kelley 2006), Neighbourhood states would be re-made (Bicchi 2006) in the
EU’s particular view of itself (Del Sarto 2016). Since underpinning that regu-
latory framework were the Union’s own ‘fundamental values’, the EU sees
itself as a ‘normative power’ (Manners 2002), capable of defining a new, pro-
gressive ‘normal’ for third countries. This approach, in turn, is rooted in the
EU’s reading of its own history and, in particular, of the reasons for its econ-
omic and political success. In the process of forging this historical revisionism
around political and economic neoliberalism, the Union has elided the role of
both Keynesian macroeconomic strategy – including labour protections –
and of the state’s provision of welfare and essential services, which were
crucial both in creating prosperity and in reinforcing social and political
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cohesion in post-WWII Europe (Teti et al. 2020). Indeed, the EU only included
democracy promotion in its foreign policy agenda after the end of the Cold
War when it came to see, along with other Western countries and the IFIs,
democracy and capitalism as the only path to development (Abrahamsen
2000; Teti et al. 2020). Subsequent policy agreements reflect this logic,
from the first policy agreement with North African countries that included
democracy and conditionality clauses – the European Mediterranean Partner-
ship agreed at Barcelona in 1995 (European Commission 1995) – to the
current European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), initially introduced in 20043
and revised following the Uprisings first in 2011 and then in 2015 (European
Commission 2004, 2015, 2011a, 2011b).
However, in exporting its self-image through foreign policy, the EU leaves
out an essential element of its success: social democracy, rather than mere
market democratisation (Pace and Seeberg 2010; Pace 2009). The Union pro-
motes neo-liberal economic policies without also exporting the social policies
which enabled Europe to moderate the inequalities of the market and which
– at least partly – accounts for its social cohesion (Teti et al. 2020). Indeed,
since the establishment of the Union, the essential role of these social policies
has been increasingly elided in EU policy documentation.4
Detailed analyses of the discursive structure and constructions of democ-
racy in EU policy documentation betrays as much (Teti 2012; Teti et al. 2020).
For present purposes, the Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity
(PDSP) (March 2011) – the first and most progressive of these documents –
will serve to illustrate broader trends.
First, the preambles of such post-Arab Spring EU Neighbourhood Policy
documents from the PDSP onwards display a holistic view of democracy,
remarking on its inseparability from ‘indivisible’ human rights – i.e. implicitly,
both civil–political and socio-economic –, social inclusion (welfare) and
‘inclusive development’. However, within the body of PDSP – and of each
policy document since the ‘Arab Spring’ began – that holistic vision is
slowly but surely eroded, leaving precisely the same vision of ‘market democ-
racy’which was the hallmark of both the EU’s pre-Uprisings ENP and of its his-
torically revisionist narrative about its own, internal development.
Second, civil–political rights are only selectively espoused: while docu-
ments frequently mention rights such as voting and freedom of thought
and conscience, they generally omit the rights to organise and protest. More-
over, PDSP and all subsequent ENP policy implicitly establish a hierarchy
between civil–political and socio-economic rights. This hierarchy is evident,
for example, in the fact that whenever these documents mention civil and
political rights, they invariably explicitly link them to democracy, whereas
social and economic rights are not. In fact, throughout, PDSP refers to
issues of social justice and social and economic questions as matters of devel-
opment, growth and economic policy generally, but never uses the language
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of rights in connection to these. By contrast, civil and political rights are never
similarly ‘demoted’.
Finally, this ‘relegation’ of socio-economic rights – as well as political rights
such as the right to protest, which authoritarian regimes consider ‘sensitive’ –
finds a counterpart in the realm of (macro) economic strategy. PDSP states
that the Uprisings represented ‘the hope of a better life for the people of
the region and for greater respect of human rights, pluralism, rule of law
and social justice – universal values that we all share’ (European Commission
2011a, 2) and that only ‘sustainable and inclusive growth development of
poorer regions and job creation’ that meets the population’s demands can
help deliver these (European Commission 2011a, 7). At first brush, one
might think that the EU would then reflect on the evidence that the ‘neolib-
eral’ strategies which the likes of Tunisia or Egypt – ironically, lauded by the
IMF for their ‘reforms’ shortly before their respective revolutions – produce
socio-economic problems which have only worsened since their introduction
in the late 1970s/early 1980s. However, PDSP and successive documents do
not say how the Union intends to apply these lessons by changing the
logic underpinning its trade, development, or lending strategies. Much less
does PDSP recognise even the possibility of a link between its own economic
strategies and the causes of the Uprisings insofar as the former contribute to
exacerbating problems of inequality, poverty and precarity. The only appar-
ent change – rather than ‘tactical’ increases in funds available for loans or
aid – is in the EU’s shift from advocating Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) to
‘Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements’ (DCFTAs). For the EU,
the problem appeared to be not the nature of neoliberal economic strategy
but the intensity and breadth of its application.
What emerges from analysing the conceptual structure of post-Uprisings
documents is a strong continuity with the rationales and strategies for demo-
cratisation and development found in pre-Uprising ones. Despite talk of ‘indi-
visible’ human rights, democracy is understood as achievable merely through
the exercise of a narrow subset of civil–political rights, ‘demoting’ rights such
as association and protest, and reducing socio-economic rights to matters of
economic strategy. Development policy, for its part, continues to rely on
market-driven neoliberal processes, which have notably failed since they
began to be applied in former ‘revolutionary republics’ in North Africa and
the Arab world more generally in the 1970s (e.g. Egypt) and 1980s (e.g.
Tunisia).
In stark contrast to the central importance of socio-economic rights
and social justice to North African respondents, the EU continues to think
of democracy as little more than the exercise of a restricted category of
civil–political rights – which, ironically, are precisely those rights North
African regimes have been eager to dress autocracy with (Collier and Levitsky
1997).
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Conclusion
The analysis of public opinion polling data presented here confirms and
expands upon earlier, more limited studies suggesting that North African citi-
zens think of democracy not just in formal, institutional terms but see it as
inextricably linked to substantive outcomes such as social justice. In doing
so, this study complements qualitative, interview-based research, which has
long highlighted the importance of such issues.
A country-level analysis of respondents’ conception of religion – to the
extent that this is possible, given current survey designs – suggests simplistic
arguments concerning the (in)compatibility of religion and democracy or the
supposed ‘essential’ traits of the former are unsustainable. Instead, survey evi-
dence suggests respondents may be articulating a demand for social justice
through religious symbolic repertoires.
Our analysis of survey data also highlights the importance of both socio-
economic rights and religion and the relation of both to democracy – in citi-
zens’ minds. Certainly, people value democracy and freedom from oppres-
sion, and – like the EU – they understand democracy as requiring civil and
political rights. However, citizens also believe democracy entails a thicker,
more ‘social’ democracy that guarantees economic and social rights in prin-
ciple and delivers on them in practice.
The significance of this conception of democracy was not taken into
account in either pre-or post-Uprisings EU Neighbourhood Policy. There is
a mismatch between the conception of democracy at the heart of the EU’s
policy ‘supply’ and the conception held by populations in their ‘demand’
for democracy. Survey evidence suggests this mismatch contributes to the
EU’s poor reputation and ‘normative powerlessness’ in its Southern Neigh-
bourhood. Moreover, by not meeting people’s demand for both more
social justice and political freedom, the EU contributes to those structural
economic and political factors which drive discontent, and thus instability
and insecurity, including its own.
Notes
1. Missing values: Algeria 7.5%, Egypt 26.6%, Libya 32%, Morocco 14%, Tunisia
18.3%
2. Missing values: Algeria 3.4%, Egypt 10.5%, Libya 1.7%, Morocco 15.1%, Tunisia
4.4%.
3. The ENP was very strongly influenced by the accession criteria developed in the
context of the EU’s post-Cold War ‘Eastern Expansion’. This was also true of the
EU’s foreign service (RelEx, then External Action Service) and drafters of the ENP,
many of whom previously worked in DG Enlargement. This ‘expanded’
approach to the Mediterranean took very little account of how regional popu-
lations conceived of ’democracy’. For more detailed examinations of these
issues, see Teti et al. (2020).
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4. The genealogy of the Union’s ‘neoliberalism’ and its – and its Member States’ –
abandonment of social democracy is complex, its precise origin debatable, but
might be traced to the 1993 ‘Copenhagen Criteria’ (which emphasise demo-
cratic institutions, market economies, and the legal-institutional acquis commu-
nautaire), the 1985 Single European Act and the Delors Commissions
themselves, or even the 1975 Helsinki Conference principles.
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